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Abstract
Privately informed individuals speak openly in front of other members of a com-
mittee about the desirability of a public decision. Each individual wishes to appear
well informed. For any given order of speech, committee members may herd by
suppressing their true information. With individuals of heterogeneous expertise, op-
timizing over the order of speech can improve the extraction of information, but not
perfectly so. It is not always optimal to use the common anti-seniority rule whereby
experts speak in order of increasing expertise. A committee with more able experts
may be afflicted by greater herding problems, yielding a worse outcome.
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One Englishman is an island.
Two Englishmen are a queue.
Three Englishmen are a committee.
1. Introduction
According to Condorcet’s (1785) jury theorem, the majority of equally competent indi-
viduals who vote independently in a dichotomous election are more likely than a single
individual to make the optimal decision. Furthermore, the probability of an optimal deci-
sion converges to one as the number of individuals in the group increases to infinity. Since
Condorcet, many social scientists have studied voting behavior and its outcome.1 The
preceding stage of debate is instead more difficult to model and less well understood.
Typically, the modality of debate matters for its outcome, as forcefully argued by the
psychologist Janis (1982). His influential book gives a detailed account of a number of poor
decisions made by foreign-policy committees during the administration of five American
presidents of the second half of this century. He argues that each of these decisions, as
well as many other committee decisions, are the disastrous product of interaction in small
groups and ascribes them to the syndrome of Groupthink. Groupthink is defined as the
psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents
the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. Among the prescriptions
suggested by Janis to alleviate the deleterious effects of Groupthink are: give someone the
role of devil’s advocate, dampen signals sent by committee members, re-open the debate,
split the committee in sub-committees, and have agents reporting directly to the leader
(without others listening). The Persians in ancient times would have simply reconsidered
the matter under the influence of wine!
In this paper we build a simple model of debate among experts who are motivated
by their reputation as good forecasters. As first formally modeled by Holmstro¨m (1982),
the labor market provides this implicit incentive scheme. Conformism is then explained in
terms of self interest for reputation and full rationality. When speaking in sequence, experts
learn from the statements previously made by other experts, similarly to what happens in
the herding models of Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Banerjee (1992), and Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). In this setting different rules of debate result in different
outcomes. Given a group of heterogenous experts, it matters in which order they speak.
This ordering issue is relevant for many debate fora, such as parliamentary subcommittees,
executive boards, central bank monetary committees, war councils, and juries.
1See Grofman and Owen (1986) for a survey of a number of interesting extensions of Condorcet’s
jury theorem and Piketty (1999) for more recent references. See Ladha (1992) for a generalization of
Condorcet’s result to environments with correlated beliefs.
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Concern for the order of debate is old. According to the Talmud “in capital charges,
we commence with [the opinion of] those on the side [benches]” (Sanhedrin 32a Mishnah)
where the lesser judges were seated in the Sanhedrin.2 Similar anti-seniority rules are im-
plicit in most hierarchies and judicial systems, where more competent experts are promoted
to high level courts where they treat cases referred by lower level courts.3 Intuitively, when
more expert advisers speak later, the debate extracts some of the information possessed
by junior experts who, despite being less informed, express their opinions without being
subject to the overriding influence of more senior experts.4
Despite the special features of our model, it illustrates well the issues arising when
arranging a debate among heterogenous experts. Experts without any prior private in-
formation on own expertise are asked to reveal in sequence their noisy information about
the desirability of a public decision. Signaling of information is costless and information
is soft, in that no proof can be given to substantiate one’s claim. The receiver (decision
maker) must finally take a decision under uncertainty, and the more information gleaned
from the senders, the higher the receiver’s payoff. The payoff of a sender (expert) depends
on the receiver’s belief on expertise updated ex post on the basis of the message sent and
the realized state of the world. The model is a variant of Scharfstein and Stein (1990),
keeping two states of the world, two signal values, and two ability types parametrizing
the informativeness of the signals (expertise). Departing from Scharfstein and Stein, we
assume that signals are independently drawn conditionally on the state of the world, and
that the experts have heterogeneous ex ante reputations.
A single expert can credibly signal her information only when the prior belief on the
state of the world is balanced enough. When the prior belief is well biased in one direction,
an expert who receives a signal contrary to the expectation can only believe that the signal
is likely to be in error. It is bad for the expert’s reputation to convey such a signal, so
the expert will prefer to pretend to have observed the expected signal. Such a deviation
is inconsistent with equilibrium, so the unique equilibrium is pooling.
236a: “Whence is this derived? ... Scripture states: thou shalt not speak against the chief [of the
judges]”. “Therefore the opinion of the lesser judges is first ascertained” (footnote 2, page 228, The
Babylon Talmud, Seder Nezikin, London, Soncino Press, 1935, ed. by Isidore Epstein). See also Exodus
23, 2: “You shalt not be led into wrongdoing by the majority”.
3See Daughety and Reinganum (1999) for a rather different model of decision making in hierarchies of
courts where herding results.
4Seniority considerations are present in the rules of debate and voting followed by the U.S. Supreme
Court. From “The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States”, page 174: “Customar-
ily, the chief justice frames the discussion of a case with a review of its facts and mention of its history and
of relevant legal precedent. In descending order of seniority, the remaining justices present their views. In
the past, a vote was taken after the newest justice to the Court spoke, with the justices voting in order of
ascending seniority largely, it was said, to avoid pressure from long-term members of the Court on their
junior colleagues. By contrast, recent practice suggests that the initial comments of each justice carry an
indication of that individual’s vote, making a separate vote unnecessary in most instances. After everyone
has spoken, the chief justice announces his vote tally before moving on to the next case.”
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In our dynamic setting, each expert is asked in sequence to express her opinion in
front of other experts. As information about the state accumulates by listening to pre-
vious experts, the prior on the state becomes more extreme. In order for information to
be revealed in the most informative equilibrium, it is then necessary to have an expert
with higher quality of information. With conditionally independent signals of bounded
precision on the state of the world, herding a` la Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch
(1992) eventually arises. There is therefore a bound to the amount of information that
can be aggregated and eventually used, in sharp contrast to the outcome resulting in the
environment considered by Condorcet.
Since herding arises for any given order of speech, valuable information may be lost in
the debate. Modifying the order of speech may decrease the incidence of herding, when
the experts have information of heterogeneous precision. Our simple model allows us to
illustrate several important effects due to the second-best nature of debate. First, the
Sanhedrin’s anti-seniority rule is optimal only under special circumstances. On the one
hand, when the most expert adviser speaks early, less qualified advisers dare not disagree
regardless of the information they have. On the other hand, if several junior experts
initially express an agreement, more senior experts may become themselves unable to
credibly signal their private information. All in all, there is a tension between allowing the
well-informed experts to speak early thereby losing many weak opinions, and waiting until
more poorly-informed experts have spoken at the risk of losing the information of stronger
ones. Second, with five or more experts of nearly equal (but distinct) reputation, it is
impossible to designate a speech order in which the experts reveal all relevant information.
It is harder to aggregate information when there is less expertise heterogeneity among
experts. Third, increasing the quality of some experts on the committee can exacerbate
herd behavior and hence decrease the amount of information collected by the decision
maker. As summarized here, our main findings have a negative nature. This suggests that
a positive theory requires very special assumptions, and we do not offer one.
After reviewing the literature in Section 2, we formulate the model in Section 3, and
discuss the optimal order of debate in Section 4. A shortcoming of our model is that in
some circumstances simultaneous information revelation dominates sequential debate. In
Section 5 we compare the outcomes of the sequential and simultaneous mechanisms, and
we discuss situations which favor one over the other.5 Section 6 discusses a number of open
questions and extensions of the basic model. For instance, we consider the case of experts
with a partisan bias. When the current opinion favors one decision, strong opponents to
this may be the only credible speakers. Diversity of incentives may foster debate. Section 7
5The ancient Spartan assembly Apella reached its decisions by a shouting vote conducted after a debate
amongst its highest-ranking members. Such a vote could be analyzed in the simultaneous herding game




Consider a situation where a decision is to be made under uncertainty on the state of the
world after consulting informed individuals (i.e. experts) who give individual recommen-
dations (or votes). Klevorick, Rothschild and Winship (1984) characterize the maximum
improvement that can be achieved by collecting all information compared to majority vot-
ing in the absence of incentive problems. When instead individual incentives are taken
into account, the aggregation of information depends on how the objective functions of the
experts depend on the final decision made, the state of the world and the recommendations
given (or messages sent).
Firstly, the experts could be interested in how their recommendations relates to the
final decision. For example, a referee who is reviewing an article for an academic journal
might desire that the editor decides in accordance with the recommendation given. In this
spirit, Glazer and Rubinstein (1998) compare mechanisms to elicit information when the
experts either share the preferences of the social planner (public motive) or also wish that
the decision maker follows their recommendation (private motive).
Secondly, payoffs could depend on the decision and the state of the world, as in models
of strategic voting and cheap talk. In the growing literature on strategic voting, Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1997) consider voters with different preferences for the public decision,
McLennan (1998) assumes that the privately informed voters have the common interest to
make the socially optimal decision, and Dekel and Piccione (2000) compare equilibria in
sequential and simultaneous dichotomous elections. Information can also be transmitted
through costless signaling, as in Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) model of cheap-talk com-
munication. There a perfectly informed expert (sender) of known partisan bias is able to
credibly transmit part of the information to an uncommitted decision maker (receiver) by
sending costless messages. The amount of information which can be credibly communi-
cated in equilibrium depends on the congruence of the preferences of sender and receiver.
Cheap talk models have been fruitfully applied to political settings.6 While in some polit-
ical and economic situations the partisan objective is meaningful, specialization of labor
suggests that information be provided by non-partisan professional experts.
Thirdly, the objective function of the experts could depend on the recommendations
given and the state of the world. This happens in our model because of reputational consid-
6See, for example, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989), Austen-Smith (1990), and Krishna and Morgan (1998)
for cheap-talk models of simultaneous and sequential debate among experts with known heterogeneous
partisan biases. In Friedman’s (1998) model the decision to become an expert endogenously depends
on the partisan bias. Spector (2000) studies conditions whereby rational debate leads to unidimensional
conflict in a model with common interest but heterogeneous priors.
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erations. We consider professional experts who are concerned about the public perception
about the quality of their information. The audience updates the belief on the expert’s
ability according to the recommendation provided and the realized state of the world. It
is natural to posit a similar reputational objective not only for professional experts but
also when modeling plain conversation among people who have common preferences over
alternatives or have a negligible effect on the final decision.7
Our model provides a manageable framework to analyze sequential cheap talk by as-
suming conditional independence across experts of different abilities. This is our main
departure from Scharfstein and Stein (1990), who instead impose that more able experts
have more correlated signals conditionally on the state of the world. They fix the prior on
the state, such that an informative equilibrium exists for the first expert but not for the
second. With conditional correlation, the dynamic model cannot be solved forward, other
than in their case where the second and all later managers herd. If the second manager
were informative, it would be necessary to go back and check the incentives of the first
manager. With our natural assumption of conditionally independent signals, the dynamic
model can instead be solved forward. We describe the most informative equilibrium of the
game with a single expert treating the prior on the state parametrically, and use it as a
building block for our dynamic model.
Finally, often the payoff functions of the informed individuals depend on their recom-
mendations, the state of the world, as well as the decision taken. For example, costly
political action can be undertaken to signal one’s information to the electorate, as in the
signaling stage of Lohmann’s (1994) model. In the cheap-talk framework, Sobel (1985)
was the first to study reputation building by an informed advisor who could have opposite
interests to the decision maker. In a similar vein, Morris (1999) explores the implications
of reputational concerns for the advice of experts who could be either good (concerned
about both the payoff of the decision maker and their reputation) or bad (with a partisan
bias for one action).
While in the cheap-talk approach the receiver takes the optimal decision given the
information inferred, Prendergast and Stole (1996) assume that the decision is delegated
to the informed party (or equivalently the receiver commits to an identity mapping from
message to decision). They also assume a mixed objective function, where the manager
(expert) cares about the reputation about ability as well as the payoff attained with the
decision taken. Delegation then results in a drastically different outcome; in their equi-
librium, the manager fully reveals her information but distorts the investment taken with
respect to the level preferred by the principal.8 In our context with multiple experts, how-
7Shiller (1995) calls for a better understanding of how conversation determines social behavior.
8Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997) construct a symmetric-information model where decision on a public
investment project is delegated to an incumbent politician who wishes to be re-elected. The unknown
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ever, delegation is not as natural as cheap-talk consultation, since it is unclear to which
expert decision making should be delegated.
A completely different take on debate is offered by models where the informed party
can to a certain extent prove a true claim. Lipman and Seppi (1995) consider an unin-
formed decision maker who seeks advice from several symmetrically informed agents with
conflicting preferences. A large amount of information can be collected even with limited
provability and little information on the preferences of the speakers. Glazer and Rubin-
stein (1997) look for mechanisms which enable the listener to maximize the probability of
making the correct decision while economizing on the amount of information transmitted.
Their model provides a rationale for the fact that two statements which would be equally
strong if made in isolation acquire different strength if used as counter-arguments.
3. Model
Actions and states of the world. One of two actions a ∈ {a0, a1} is taken under
uncertainty on the binary state of the world ω ∈ {ω0, ω1}. The state of the world is
unknown to the decision maker and the experts who share the same prior belief q = Pr(ω1).
The von Neumann-Morgenstern payoff of the decision maker (or designer, or receiver) if
a is chosen in state ω is uDM(a, ω). We restrict attention to the special symmetric case
where uDM(a0, ω0) = u
DM(a1, ω1) = 1 and u
DM(a0, ω1) = u
DM(a1, ω0) = 0, giving rise to
the decision-maker threshold of indifference between the two decisions qˆDM = 1/2.
In the classic jury environment, the model is interpreted as follows. A person on trial,
who is either innocent (state ω0) or guilty (ω1), can be either acquitted (action a0) or
convicted (a1). We differ from the jury literature by assuming that jurors/experts are
uninterested in the action a, but only care about making the right recommendation. For
example, professional judges (e.g. in the Supreme Court) may be motivated by such career
concerns.
Experts and ability types. Experts are indexed with letters, I ∈ {A,B,C, . . . , Z}.
Private information of an expert is assumed noisy, so that something (but not everything)
about the state of the world can be learned by listening to experts. Expert I receives
the binary signal σI ∈ {σ0, σ1}. For simplicity we consider the symmetric case where the
precision (or quality) ρI gives the probability that expert I receives the “correct” signal.
Thus, expert I has Pr(σk|ωj) = ρI if k = j, and Pr(σk|ωj) = 1 − ρI when k 6= j, where
k, j ∈ {0, 1}. The signal qualities, but not the realized signals, are common knowledge
ability of the politician adds to the project’s value, when it is undertaken. The electorate then evaluates
the ability of the politician based on realized performance. Biglaiser and Mezzetti characterize the bias
induced by such reputational concerns on the investment decision made by the incumbent politician.
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among all experts and the decision maker. Conditionally on state ω, the signal received
by different experts are statistically independent.
Even though the above description of experts’ information is sufficient for later sections,
more details are needed in order to fully describe the motivation of experts. Each expert





(0, 1). The prior belief on ability is common to all experts and the decision maker, so that
an expert does not have private information on her own type. An expert of type T has
signal distribution Pr(σk|ωj, t) = t if k = j, and Pr(σk|ωj, t) = 1 − t when k 6= j, where
k, j ∈ {0, 1}. A good expert has a more precise signal, 1/2 ≤ b < g ≤ 1. The expected
quality of the signal of expert I with prior pI on ability is then ρI = pIg + (1− pI)b.
Debate and timing. The set of experts on the committee is given from the outset.
The designer selects an order of speech in the debate. The state of the world is realized
but not observed, and the privately observed signals are realized. Then the debate takes
place. Each expert speaks exactly once, and the message is immediately heard by all other
experts, by the decision maker, and by the labor market. The message space has the same
cardinality as the signal space, {m0,m1}. After the conclusion of the debate, the decision
maker takes the action which is optimal given the information revealed. Finally, the state
of the world is realized and used by the market to update the reputation of each single
expert in conjunction with their reports.
Objective of the experts. The members of the committee are professional experts,
exclusively concerned about their reputation for possessing information of good quality.
The market observes the message sent by an expert as well as the realization of the state
of the world, and updates the expert’s reputation for expertise. Experts who are known
to have better information have a higher market value v (g) > v (b), and the preferences
of the experts are assumed to have a von-Neumann Morgenstern representation, so that
an expert who is believed to be good with probability p = Pr(g|m,ω) has a payoff of
V (p) = pv (g) + (1− p) v (b), linearly increasing in posterior reputation p. The expert’s
objective is to send the message which maximizes the expected value of reputation EV (p)
conditional on the information at her disposal, where the expectation is taken with respect
to the equilibrium strategy of the receiver and the realization of the state of the world.
Updating belief on state of the world. A prior belief q is updated after a signal σk
of quality ρ according to Bayes’ rule to give the posterior
fρk (q) =
Pr (σk|ω1) q
Pr (σk|ω1) q + Pr (σk|ω0) (1− q) =

ρq
ρq+(1−ρ)(1−q) for k = 1
(1−ρ)q
(1−ρ)q+ρ(1−q) for k = 0.
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l (q), it is easy
to check that two opposing signals of equal quality exactly offset each other, fρ0 f
ρ
1 (q) ≡ q,
and that the order of signal observation is irrelevant, fρkf
λ
l (q) ≡ fλl fρk (q).
Expert equilibrium behavior. Consider an expert of quality ρI who is asked to speak
when the common prior belief on the state is q. We now show that an expert can credibly
signal her information only when the prior q is fairly balanced. When q is sufficiently
extreme, an expert with an unlikely signal must infer that the signal received is most
probably in error. Being bad for the reputation to send such a signal, such an expert
prefers to pretend to have observed the likely signal. Such a deviation is inconsistent with
separating beliefs of the receiver, so the unique equilibrium is pooling.
Lemma 1 (Unknown own ability). When the expert is uniformed about own ability,
the most informative equilibrium of the reputational signaling game is separating (i.e. fully
revealing) for q ∈ [1− ρI , ρI ], and pooling (i.e. uninformative) for q /∈ [1− ρI , ρI ].
Proof. See Appendix.
In accordance with this Lemma, the expert’s reputational objective implies a simple
equilibrium behavior: The individual says m0 when the posterior belief on state ω1 is
f < qˆI ≡ 1/2, and says m1 otherwise. Notice that this is the same behavior which would
result if the individual were to act on the basis of a purely statistical objective (i.e. if they
had the same payoff function we have posited for the decision maker).
4. Debate among experts of heterogeneous expertise
Before discussing the issues arising when ordering heterogeneous experts, consider briefly
the outcome of our sequential debate model with an arbitrarily fixed order of speech. The
history of messages credibly transmitted by the previous speakers is used by an expert to
form the belief q on the state of the world. Such belief is then updated on the basis of the
private signal received. When q ∈ [1−ρI , ρI ], the statement made in the most informative
equilibrium fully reveals this private signal. In this case, updating by the listeners (other
experts and decision maker) parallels the private updating by the sender. Otherwise, the
most informative equilibrium is pooling. Such an expert, whose statement does not contain
any information, is said to be herding. In conclusion, the mechanics of the binary-signal
reputational model are the same as in the statistical model of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer
and Welch (1992).9 As noted by them, herding implies a loss of relevant information.
9In Ottaviani and Sørensen (2000) we clarify the relationship between statistical and reputational
herding, which is more subtle when the signal is not binary. There we also discuss the role of differential









































Figure 1: Illustration of the equilibrium as a function of the prior q for fixed quality
ρ = 2/3. In the left-most panel, departing from q = 1/2 the expert’s two possible signals
lead to posterior beliefs on either side of the indifference belief qˆI = 1/2, so the expert is
credible. In the middle panel, the prior is ρ, and signal σ0 gives a posterior belief equal to
qˆI . Thus, q = ρ is the highest possible prior belief from which the expert can be credible.
In the right-most panel, q is above ρ and both posteriors are on the same side of qˆI , so
that the expert is not credible.
Clearly, the loss of information entailed by herding results in a (weak) reduction of
the decision maker’s expected payoff. In the remainder of this Section we investigate how
optimizing the order of speech can improve the information aggregation process. Consider
a designer who has a given finite set of experts, named alphabetically A,B,C, . . . by
increasing quality of their signals α < β < γ < · · ·. The optimal order of speech – which
always exists among the finitely many possible orders – achieves the highest expected
payoff of the decision maker. We focus on unconditional ordering, when the order cannot
depend on the messages sent during the debate (see Section 6 on conditional ordering).
Furthermore, each expert is asked to speak only once.
The first-best optimal decision is defined to be the one which maximizes expected payoff
of the designer when all signals are perfectly observed. The designer is said to implement
the first best, if for all signal realizations the first-best optimal decision is taken. In case
the designer has available an order implementing the first-best, this order is optimal. More
generally an optimal order need not implement the first best.
In the debate, the belief on the state is sequentially updated according to the messages
from the experts. For the purpose of our analysis, it is convenient to express Bayesian
updating in log-likelihood of beliefs. Let the strength of an expert of quality ρ be defined
by r = log(ρ/(1 − ρ)). For an arbitrary belief q ∈ (0, 1), define the log-likelihood ` =
log(q/(1 − q)) ∈ (−∞,∞). When the high signal σ1 is truthfully reported by an expert
of quality ρ starting with a prior q, the posterior fρ1 (q) has log-likelihood `1 = ` + r.
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The log-likelihood resulting after the low signal σ0 is `0 = ` − r. Notice that, after the
log-likelihood transformation, Bayesian updating is additive.
For any unordered subset I = {A, . . . , E} of experts the strength of I, s(I), is defined
as the sum of strengths of all experts in I. Thus, s(I) gives how far the belief will
move in log-likelihood terms, if all experts on the committee prove to have the same
signal. For two subsets of experts, I and J , we write I  J and say that I is stronger
than J if s(I) > s(J ). Consider finally the collection of all experts A,B, . . . , Y, Z. If
{A,B, . . . , Y } ≺ {Z} then agent Z is said to be decisive.
As seen in Section 3, in the most informative equilibrium a single expert A with a
binary signal of quality α truthfully reveals the realized signal if q ∈ [1 − α, α]. A is not
credible for any prior q < 1 − α or q > α, because the posterior beliefs conditional on
the two different realizations of the signal are on the same side of the threshold qˆA = 1/2.
Despite this, the optimal choice is made, because the information lost is not valuable given
that the posterior is on the same side of qˆDM = 1/2 regardless of the signal realization.
Lemma 2 (Inconsequential herding at the end). When the last speaker is the only
expert to be herding with positive probability, the first-best is implemented.10
Proof. By assumption all but possibly the last expert have credibly revealed their sig-
nals. Given that qˆDM = qˆI , the last speaker will not be credible exactly when possessing
information of no value to the decision maker.
Consider next a committee of two experts, A with a signal of quality α, and B with
quality β > α. For a prior q equal to 1/2, if B is first, then A will never be credible. This
is seen immediately by noticing that the posterior belief fα0 f
β
1 (1/2) after signals σ
A
0 and
σB1 is above 1/2. Nonetheless, order BA implements the first best by Lemma 2. For the
prior q in some neighborhood of 1/2, with order AB, both A and B credibly reveal their
information. Since all private information is made available to the decision maker, the first-
best action is taken. More generally, with two experts the anti-seniority rule implements
the first best also if the decision maker’s problem were more complicated (e.g. access to
other sources of information or a larger action space). For q ∈ [1/2, α] or q ∈ [fβ1 (α), 1]
both orders implement the first best, while for q ∈ (β, fβ1 (α)) no order works.11 Consider
q ∈ (α, β] for now. With order AB, A herds and B is credible; while with BA, B is
always credible and A is credible whenever useful, i.e. if and only if q > fβ1 f
α
0 (1/2) so that
A’s signal contrasting with B’s signal would change the decision. We conclude that BA






, β]. Overall, the anti-seniority rule
BA performs weakly better than AB.
10Recall that an expert who is not credible is said to be herding.
11A similar analysis applies to the symmetric case q < 1/2.
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We proceed in the following under the special assumption that the prior on the state
of the world equals the decision maker’s and the experts’ thresholds. Our method clearly
generalizes beyond this setting. The coincidence of thresholds provides the best possible
setting for optimal information extraction, since the expert credibility range lies around
the beliefs that are most important for the decision maker. That the initial prior lies
in the middle of this range should also allow the greatest possible number of experts to
communicate credibly. This assumption is thus an added strength to our negative results.
Assumption 1 (Symmetry). q = 1/2.
The next result is convenient for the analysis of examples.
Lemma 3 (Decisiveness). If one expert is decisive, any order implements the first best.
If the most informed expert is not decisive and speaks first, the first best is not achieved.
Proof. Whenever asked to speak, a decisive agent always speaks credibly, and any decision
based on that signal alone is first-best optimal. When instead there is no decisive agent
and the most informed individual speaks first, no one else can speak credibly afterwards.
With positive probability the signals of all the other experts disagree with that of most
informed one, in which case the wrong decision is taken. The first best is not achieved.
Since the payoff function of the decision maker is convex in the belief, a mean-preserving
spread in beliefs leads to a weak improvement. However, this payoff function is piecewise
linear, so the improvement need not be strict. Yet, if some additional information were to
arrive before taking the final decision, a more spread out belief would be preferable.
In committees with three experts there is an order which second-order stochastic dom-
inates (SSD) all others. When C ≺ {A,B}, the final distribution of posterior beliefs
under the order BCA is a mean-preserving spread of that achieved under any other order.
Orders CBA, CAB, BAC where the second expert is weaker than the first are inferior,
for they lead to the certain loss of one signal. All other orders have the property that
only the signal of the third individual is lost if and only if the first two experts agree.
The posterior fγ1 f
β
1 (1/2) — resulting under order BCA when the two first agree — is the
strongest posterior we can achieve. Therefore BCA dominates the others in the SSD sense
because either all three signals are observed, or the strongest possible belief is achieved.
When instead C  {A,B}, ABC dominates in the SSD sense as no signals are ever lost.
With four experts A,B,C and D, consider the case where there is no decisive agent:
{A,B,C}  D in order to avoid a trivial application of Lemma 3. Distinguish two cases:
D  {A,B} and D ≺ {A,B}.
For D  {A,B}, ABDC implements the first best by Lemma 2, since all the first three



























































Figure 2: Belief evolution with four experts satisfying {A,B,C}  {D}  {A,B}  {C}.
The figure presents an example where α = 5/8, β = 9/14, γ = 25/34, δ = 5/6. To
illustrate the inefficiency of the anti-seniority order ABCD, assume that A, B, and C
have all received private signals σ1, while D has received σ0. The left panel shows the
evolution of beliefs in the most informative equilibrium with the suboptimal order ABCD,
the right panel with the first-best order ABDC. In the left panel, after A,B have sent
identical messages, C is not strong enough to be credible. The ultimate belief leads to the
inefficient action a0, while a1 is efficiently taken when following the order ABDC.
or not. If {A,B} ≺ C, ABCD gives the first-best, as does ABDC. When alsoD  {B,C},
ACDB and BCDA implement the first-best. In this latter case, it can be shown that none
of the four first-best orders is optimal in the second-order stochastic dominance sense, (see
Proposition 1 below). Here is a brief intuition. The only candidate for the SSD-best order
is BCDA, which permits the strongest possible posterior belief (arising when B,C,D
agree). But along many possible signal outcomes A’s signal is not heard. On the other
hand, ABCD only leads to an infrequent loss of D’s signal, when A,B, and C agree. It
is not simple to decide whether a frequent loss of a poor signal (A’s) or an infrequent loss
of a good signal (D’s) is better. It can be shown that none of these orders dominates the
other.
Proposition 1 (No second-order stochastic dominance). With four or more experts,
there are cases where no order dominates all other orders in the sense of second-order
stochastic dominance of the final distribution of posterior belief.
Proof. See Appendix.
If instead {A,B}  C, the anti-seniority order ABCD does not implement the first-
best. See Figure 2. We conclude:
Proposition 2 (The anti-seniority rule is not optimal). The anti-seniority rule does
not necessarily implement the first best, even in situations where other rules implement it.
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Given this shortcoming of the anti-seniority rule, it would be desirable to device al-
ternative simple rules which perform well in many or all committees. Motivated by the
example of Figure 2, consider the following modified anti-seniority rule: Start with the
least-informed individual and progress to the next more informed individual until an indi-
vidual is met who would herd with positive probability. Set aside such an individual and
continue with the next more informed agent available. If only one individual is set aside
during the application of this procedure, Lemma 2 guarantees that the first-best decision
is implemented by asking that individual to speak at the very end. This rule improves on
the anti-seniority rule, but it will still come short of the first-best in many committees, as
implied by Proposition 3 below.
Continuing with the analysis of the four-expert committee, consider the case with
D ≺ {A,B}. Then C ≺ {A,B}, and it is straightforward to check that CDBA implements
the first best. On the other hand, ABDC does not implement the first-best since it fails
when A and B agree. This example shows that break-down of the modified anti-seniority
algorithm does not imply that the first best cannot be implemented. Yet, CDBA is not
optimal when instead D  {B,C}, since then B would herd with following D if C and
D disagree, and this would be suboptimal when D ≺ {A,B,C}. We conclude that it is
always possible to implement the first best with four agents. However, there is no single
order which works regardless of assumptions on the relative levels of expertise.
We now show that it is not always possible to achieve the first best. The argument
even shows that the first best is out of reach with an order conditional on history.
Proposition 3 (Non-implementability of the first best). With five or more experts
there are expertise combinations under which the first-best cannot be implemented.
Proof. We construct an example with five experts where the information is rather evenly
distributed. Assume the two strongest together are weaker than the three weakest together,
i.e. {D,E} ≺ {A,B,C}. Any couple of experts is then weaker than any triple. As a
consequence, any individual is weaker than any couple, {E} ≺ {A,B} (since {E}  {A,B}
would contradict D  C). After the first and the second experts credibly send the same
message, the third and any other individual thereafter will necessarily herd, because any
single individual is weaker than any couple. The first best is not implemented because the
optimal decision fails to be taken whenever the last three individuals have identical signals
opposite to those of the two first individuals.
One might think it optimal to let the debate continue as far as possible before herding.
The next proposition shows a five-person example where this is not true. In the example it
is possible to let the first three experts speak without any herding, but the resulting loss of
information due to herding of the two last speakers is so severe to preclude implementation
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of the first best. In all first-best orders the third speaker herds with positive probability.
When this speaker herds, however, the fourth speaker is again credible. Thus, herding
may be a temporary phenomenon in the optimally ordered debate.
Proposition 4 (Herding before the end). In some committees where the first-best
can be implemented, all first-best orders have the property that with positive probability
some expert herds and is followed by a credible expert.
Proof. See Appendix.
In light of this proposition, taking the most informative equilibrium period by period
does not necessarily lead to the best aggregation of information. We next construct an
example where the payoff of the decision maker is lower when the committee is composed of
more informed experts, even when the decision maker is optimizing on the order! Generally,
in second-best committees early speakers necessarily rule out some valuable communication
of later speakers. A change in the relative strengths of experts can exacerbate this effect.
Consider a committee with a fixed order. As long as the first speaker is weaker than the
second, both of their opinions are heard. Increasing the strength of the first speaker above
that of the second results in the loss of the opinion of the latter. A small increase of the
first speaker’s strength can cause such a severe loss of the second opinion (depending on
the structure of the rest of the committee) that it would be optimal to alter the order of
the whole committee. In our five-expert example, however, the loss of an opinion cannot
be offset by any change in the order.
Proposition 5 (A stronger committee can be worse). Increasing the information
quality of a committee member can result in a lower expected payoff to the designer, even
when the speech order is optimally reshuffled.
Proof. See Appendix.
In this case, the designer may be willing to pay less for a better informed expert.
This appears to contrast with our basic assumption that the expert’s value function V is
increasing in reputation. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that the non-monotonicity in
the value of a single expert in a particular committee should translate into a corresponding
non-monotonicity in the market value of expertise. Since our committee model is scale
invariant in the expert strengths, there is no natural range of expertise over which the
value function can decrease. If so, re-scaling would translate this range to all levels of
expertise. In a world where decisions of heterogeneous importance are made by various
committees, one would always expect there to be a committee willing to pay more for a
marginally stronger expert.
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Our analysis suggests that in ex-ante heterogeneous committees the actual sequencing
of speech has important effects on the efficiency of the final decision reached, and that this
heterogeneity can improve efficiency if appropriately exploited. As noted in the proof of
Proposition 3, a homogeneous committee is particularly susceptible to herding. Imagine
now a designer shopping in the expert market for any committee with experts of total
strength s. Keeping fixed the overall strength of the committee while allowing differing
degrees of strength heterogeneity, it is optimal to concentrate all strength in a single expert:
Proposition 6 (Fewer is better). Among all committees of given strength s, the de-
signer prefers the one with only a single member.
Proof. Let ρ denote the signal quality for an expert of strength s. In the single-member
committee there is ex-ante probability 1/2 of each of the posteriors 1−ρ and ρ. Any other
committee of strength s yields a posterior belief distribution in the range [1− ρ, ρ], which
is second-order stochastically dominated.
Notice that keeping fixed the overall strength of the committee is equivalent to imposing
a cost of information linear in the individual strength of each expert. A more ambitious
task would be to characterize the optimal amount of heterogeneity when information has
a more general cost structure.
5. Simultaneous vs. sequential mechanisms
Up to now we have constrained the designer to sequential mechanisms. Consider the
simultaneous mechanism whereby each individual reveals the private information to the
decision maker without observing the information contemporaneously submitted by the
others. Assume that the messages are not anonymous, so that the decision maker observes
who sends which message. In our binary signal model with prior q = 1/2 the simultaneous
mechanism implements the first best, for each expert is credible by Lemma 1. However, if
the initial prior is not fair or one allows for richer signal structures, there are equilibria in
the sequential mechanism which dominate all the equilibria of the simultaneous one.
First, assume that the initial prior is q > 1/2, and there are two experts, A of quality
strength α < q, and B of quality β > q. Assume also that fβ0 f
α
1 (q) > 1/2, so that A is not
redundant for the decision. A is not credible at the initial belief because α < q. However, in
the sequential mechanism where B speaks first, A’s signal will be revealed exactly when it is
useful. The sequential debate can achieve the first best, while simultaneous voting cannot.
More generally, when starting from a prior different from 1/2, the optimal mechanism may
be to first have a few individuals speak openly, and move to the simultaneous mechanism
only once the posterior belief is close to 1/2.
15
Next, it is reasonable for the information of an expert to improve in light of the infor-
mation reported by other experts. Such information complementarities could be modeled
by conditionally dependent signals departing from a state space formulation. We speculate
that information complementarity could allow people to make more efficient use of their
information thereby increasing the attractiveness of sequential debate over secret voting.
Finally, consider an alternative signal structure. The equilibrium of the single-person
reputational game, described in Lemma 1, changes drastically when an expert has in-
formation about own ability, or equivalently, there are four signals: two signals on the
state times two signals on ability. The most informative equilibrium then resembles that
constructed by Trueman (1994):
Lemma 4 (Known own ability). Consider an expert perfectly informed about own
ability type. In the most informative equilibrium: (a) the high ability type sends mi
after σi; (b) the low ability type: (i) if q ∈ [1 − b, b], sends message mi after σi, (ii) if
q ∈ (b, 1], sends message m1 after σ1, and strictly randomizes between m1 and m0 after σ0,
(iii) if q ∈ [0, 1− b), strictly randomizes between m1 and m0 after σ1, and sends message
m0 after σ0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Asking the two experts to speak in sequence results in higher payoff than that achieved
in the simultaneous mechanism in the following example. We assume that the initial prior
belief on state is q = 1/2 and that both experts have prior reputation p = 1/2. Below we
calculate the designer’s payoff in the two mechanisms.
Simultaneous mechanism. Let the two experts send messages simultaneously. For
the ordered pair of messages, in equilibrium Pr(m1,m1|ω1) = Pr(m0,m0|ω0) = (g+ b)2/4,
Pr(m0,m1|ω1) = Pr(m1,m0|ω1) = Pr(m0,m1|ω0) = Pr(m1,m0|ω0) = (g + b)(2− g − b)/4,
and Pr(m0,m0|ω1) = Pr(m1,m1|ω0) = (2 − g − b)2/4. The expected utility achieved by
the designer when the optimal decision is taken after receiving messages mi for the first





Pr (ω|mi,mj)uDM (a, ω) .
Then U(m1,m1) = U(m0,m0) = (g + b)
2/[(g + b)2 + (2 − g − b)2] and U(m0,m1) =
U(m1,m0) = 1/2, because two messages revealing opposite signals give back the initial
belief 1/2. The expected payoff to the decision maker in the simultaneous mechanism is:
Pr(m1,m1)U(m1,m1) + Pr(m0,m0)U(m0,m0) + 2Pr(m0,m1)U(m0,m1) = (g+ b)/2. (1)
Sequential mechanism. The decision maker assesses Pr(m1|ω1) = Pr(m0|ω0) =
(g+b)/2 and Pr(m0|ω1) = Pr(m1|ω0) = (2−g−b)/2. The updated belief after observation
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of one such message is then Pr(ω1|m1) = (g+b)/2 > b or Pr(ω1|m0) = (2−g−b)/2 < 1−b.
In the sequential mechanism the second mover will necessarily be inside the mixing region
for the bad type. Let then 1− µ ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability with which she lies. Then
we have for the ordered sequence of messages:









Pr(m0,m0|ω1) = Pr(m1,m1|ω0) = 2− g − b
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The expected designer payoff under the sequential mechanism is easily computed to be
(g + b)/2 +
(g − b)(1− µ)
2
. (2)
Comparison. Comparing (1) with (2) it is immediately seen that g > b and µ < 1
imply that the expected payoff of the decision maker is larger in the sequential than in
simultaneous mechanism. Notice that in our model a second binary signal of the same
expected quality of the first one does not give any additional valuable information to the
decision maker. In the simultaneous mechanism the second expert is therefore worthless.
This is not so when the second expert listens to the first one. The expected reputational
value of the different messages available depends on the prior belief on the state determined
by the information credibly revealed by the previous experts. The decision maker is
interested in the resulting information revealed: in equilibrium the second expert is more
likely to have a strong signal when going against what the first one said.
6. Discussion and extensions
Conditional order. What if one can condition on the messages sent and look for the
optimal history-dependent order? If the unconditional order implements the first best, it
would also work as a first-best conditional order. But generally, conditional ordering gives
the designer more options, thereby yielding a higher expected payoff. There always exists
an optimal conditional order where herding happens only at the end, since it is suboptimal
to have someone who herds if a credible expert is available. Still, the proof of Proposition 3
applies, so it remains generally impossible to implement the first-best.
Incentives. We have excluded the possibility of giving explicit incentives to the experts.
Clearly, whenever the optimal order achieves the first best the restriction is not binding.
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When the first best cannot be implemented without transfer, more information can typi-
cally be obtained by providing explicit incentives. Even if the state of the world were not
verifiable, it might be possible to device payments conditional on the announcements. Also,
payments could be made contingent on the reports of the other experts. The interaction of
implicit reputational incentives with explicit monetary incentives awaits further research
along the lines of Holmstro¨m and Ricart i Costa (1986).
Partisan experts. Explicit incentives have the effect of moving the credibility region of
the expert. A similar effect occurs when experts have a bias for a certain action. If the
current belief favors one action, an expert with a private interest for the other action can
be credible.12 Debate can then continue at more extreme beliefs and is likely to result in
better aggregation of information. This is clear if the designer is allowed to use a history-
dependent order: a stalemate can be broken with a sufficiently biased speaker. But even
when the order of speech has to be fixed ex ante, biases can be used to improve efficiency.13
Notice that the more extreme the prior belief, the more partisan the speaker needs to
be in order to be credible. But partisan experts may of course kill debate if they are too
extremist. This suggests that there is an optimal degree of heterogeneity in the parliament
(achieved with representation of small minorities) and in other committees.
A partisan bias presupposes that the expert is interested in the final decision made.
In the most extreme case, an expert who cares only about the decision and who has the
same preferences of the decision maker, would always be willing to communicate the truth.
In the more general case with some weight on the reputational objective, the credibility
interval is typically wider than described in Lemma 1. Heterogeneity of preferences serves
to move these wider intervals sideways. Once the experts have non-common preferences
over the final decision, however, it becomes impossible to solve our model forwards.
Relative performance evaluation. In our model, the messages reported by other
experts are not used to evaluate an expert. Experts would instead care about how their
recommendations compare to those given by others in three instances: First, if the state
of the world were not observed perfectly by the evaluator. Second, if the signals were
not conditionally independent, as in Scharfstein and Stein’s (1990) original model. Third,
if experts were rewarded differently depending on the relative reputation developed with
12A similar point is made by Cukierman and Tommasi (1998). In their model a biased policy maker is
perfectly informed on the state of the world and faces a credibility problem. Voters are convinced of the
necessity of a policy only if it is proposed by someone who has an ideological bias against such a policy.
13This is consistent with some practices in the British Parliament: “A member may not speak until his
name has been called out by the Speaker - until he has ‘caught the Speaker’s eye’. Inevitably a number of
Members rise to speak as soon as every speech is ended, and the Speaker tries to obtain a representative
debate by calling members from alternate sides of the House, and of various political colours.” (Eric Taylor,
“The House of Commons at Work”, Penguin Books, 1967 (Seventh Edition), page 91).
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respect to other competing experts.14
Relative reputational concerns might be particularly relevant for repeated committee
meetings, where the expert desires to advance in the hierarchy. This can generate incentives
to go against the current. If all predecessors have sent identical messages, the next expert is
biased in favor of the opposite message, on the gamble that she can (with some probability)
race past all her competitors in the hierarchy. The designer may wish to take advantage of
such behavior when it improves the aggregation of information. Relative evaluation might
also induce an incentive in early-moving individuals to misrepresent their information,
hoping to ruin the reputation of the best-reputed experts.
Heterogeneous reputational concerns. Junior members of a committee or organiza-
tion are more likely to be driven by their reputational concerns than more senior ones who
are already at the end of their career. Furthermore, less information is often known about
the ability of junior agents. In order to consider this extension of the model, one would
need to introduce a mixed objective function with age-dependent weight on the statistical
and reputational payoffs. Careful analysis of this extension awaits future research.
Optimal order in the statistical herding model. Our results have also some impli-
cations for the optimal order in the statistical herding model of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch (1992) when agents have binary private information of heterogeneous quality.
This is a consequence of the equivalence of the equilibrium behavior in our reputational
model with the behavior in the corresponding statistical herding model. When the first-
best can be implemented, all existing valuable information is made available to the last
agent. In this sense, our analysis equivalently compares different orders in terms of their
long-run statistical welfare. According to Lemma 3, whenever the most informed (non-
decisive) individual acts first, some valuable information for the last decision maker is lost.
As a consequence of Proposition 2 (and the discussion thereafter), in some instances there
are orders which can achieve the first best, even if it is not optimal for the most informed
individual to be the last one to act (or even if the modified anti-seniority algorithm sets
aside more than one individual).
7. Conclusion
A committee member A, who is not too well informed, is afraid to reveal information
possessed when called to speak after some more informed member B has already expressed
an opinion which contrasts with A’s private knowledge. The crucial ingredients to this
14See Effinger and Polborn (2000) for an interesting investigation in this direction. Ottaviani and
Sørensen (1999) discuss a case where relative reputational concerns do not affect the equilibrium.
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story are that (1) members of the committee are imperfect experts on the matter to be
decided in that their private information is not fully conclusive, (2) they are heterogeneous,
in the sense that some of them have more accurate information than others and this is
common knowledge, (3) they speak sequentially, and (4) aim at improving their reputation
as good experts, and (5) they do not know (much better than the receiver) the quality of
their own information.
In these circumstances the design of the rules of debate can alleviate the tendency to
conform which arises when experts are motivated by reputational concerns. Notice that
most of the prescriptions suggested by Janis (1982) and listed in the introduction would
also work in our model.15 The additional remedy suggested by our explanation is to follow
an optimal order depending on the level of information held by the committee members.
Although we have only characterized some particular cases and provided a partial account
of the implications of this framework, we believe that the insights gained from our specific
model shed some light on a number of interesting issues relating to strategic information
revelation in committees. For instance, more outside visibility might increase conformity,
contrary to what one might think (see Robert Chote, “Victims of ‘Groupthink”’, Financial
Times, September 7, 1998).
The assumption of conditionally independent private signals in the reputational cheap-
talk model makes the analysis of dynamic reputational cheap talk manageable. The model
can be naturally applied to decision making in organizations where individuals are het-
erogeneously informed and concerned about their reputation. The sequential arrangement
of individuals corresponds to a vertical hierarchy. More generally, the aggregation of dis-
persed information depends on the organizational form.
The different applications of reputational cheap talk call for more general versions of
the basic static version of the model. In this direction, Campbell (1998) and Ottaviani and
Sørensen (1999) show that equilibrium communication is coarse in a reputational setting,
similarly to Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) findings in the partisan model. For instance, in
a natural generalization of the symmetric binary-signal model to allow for a continuum of
states, signals, and ability types only two messages are sent in equilibrium.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Let p denote the prior probability that the expert is of type g. In a separating equilib-
rium the expert sends a different message depending on the signal received. Then:
hij (p) ≡ Pr(g|mi, ωj) =

pg
pg+(1−p)b for i = j
p(1−g)
p(1−g)+(1−p)(1−b) for i 6= j
Clearly hij(p) = hji(p) < p < hii(p) = hjj(p) for i 6= j. When is truthtelling indeed
optimal? An expert who has received signal σ0 will send message m0 if
f0(q)V (h01) + (1− f0(q))V (h00) ≥ f0(q)V (h11) + (1− f0(q))V (h10),
or equivalently by the assumption that V (.) is increasing
fρ0 (q) ≤
(V00 − V10)
(V11 − V01) + (V00 − V10) = 1/2,
where V00−V10 = V11−V01 follows from symmetry of the signal structure and Vij ≡ V (hij).
Likewise the expert with σ1 will send message m1 if
f1(q)V (h11) + (1− f1(q))V (h10) ≥ f1(q)V (h01) + (1− f1(q))V (h00),
or fρ1 (q) ≥ 1/2. Notice that fρ0 (q) ≤ 1/2 can be rewritten as q ≤ ρI , and fρ1 (q) ≥ 1/2 as
q ≥ 1− ρI , so that separation is an equilibrium outcome if and only if 1− ρI ≤ q ≤ ρI .
In a pooling (or babbling) equilibrium the chance of sending a particular message does
not depend on the signal received. Then no inference can be made by the receiver, so
hij(p) = p for any i, j. This completely uninformative equilibrium always exists.
A hybrid mixed-strategy equilibrium features elements of both separating and pooling.
For q ∈ [1/2, ρ] the expert with signal σ1 sendsm1, while the expert with signal σ0 sendsm0
with some probability µ0,0 ∈ (0, 1) and m1 with complementary probability µ1,0 = 1−µ0,0.
Since V is linear, µ0,0 = (2q − 1)/(ρ − 1 + q). It can be easily shown that there are no
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other hybrid equilibria. For q ∈ [1− ρ, 1/2] the corresponding hybrid equilibrium has the
expert with signal σ1 mixing. For q outside [1−ρ, ρ] there is no hybrid equilibrium. Notice
that the hybrid equilibrium is less Blackwell-informative than the separating equilibrium
— the equilibrium randomization is a garbling.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Assume there are four individuals, satisfying the criteria {A,B,C}  D, D  {B,C},
C  {A,B}. An example has α = 0.55, β = 0.60, γ = 0.67, δ = 0.77.
Since there exist first-best orders in these cases, the only possible candidates for opti-
mality in the second-order stochastic dominance sense are the first-best orders. It follows
from Lemma 2 that the orders ABCD, ABDC, ACDB, and BCDA are first-best, since
the only signal ever lost is that of the last speaker. A little effort proves that no other
order is first-best. The problem for any other order is that the wrong decision is made
when A,B,C all agree, but D disagrees with them.
Among the four candidate orders, BCDA is the one which can provide the strongest
possible belief, namely when B,C,D agree. Therefore, BCDA is the only candidate to be
best in the SSD sense. We will however prove that the belief distribution that arises under
BCDA does not dominate the distribution from ABCD; then no order is SSD-best.
First notice that when the private signals are realized such that all beliefs are revealed
under both orders, then both belief distributions have an identical component. This com-
ponent will not influence the comparison of the two distributions. We can thus ignore the
contributions from all those histories. Moreover, by symmetry of the belief distributions, it
is sufficient to concentrate on beliefs above 1/2. Recall, that an expert’s strength is the log-
likelihood, r = log(ρ/(1−ρ)). The assumptions on strengths are exactly 0 < a < b < c < d,
a+ b+ c > d, d > b+ c, c > a+ b. Now, let σIj means that agent I has received signal σj.
Under the order ABCD the only signal ever lost is that of D, and it happens only when














0 ), result in
belief a + b + c. Under the other order BCDA they would result in beliefs b + c + d and
a+ b+ c− d.
Under the order BCDA, the only loss is of A’s signal. This loss occurs when D agrees














































sulting in beliefs b+ c+ d, b− c+ d, and −b+ c+ d. Under the other order, however, they
result in a+ b+ c, −a+ b+ c+ d, a+ b− c+ d, −a+ b− c+ d, a− b+ c+ d, −a− b+ c+ d.
We have found the (log-likelihoods of) beliefs to consider, and they can be almost
totally ordered as follows: 0 < a+ b+ c− d < −a+ b− c+ d < b− c+ d < a+ b− c+ d <
{−a− b+ c+ d, a+ b+ c} < −b+ c+ d < a− b+ c+ d < −a+ b+ c+ d < b+ c+ d.
Let F denote the distribution of final beliefs under the order ABCD and let G denote
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that distribution under BCDA. If G were SSD dominated by F , then∫ 1
r




for all r ∈ [0, 1]. We now show that this condition is violated at the point r∗ = β(1 −
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so that we obtain by algebraic manipulation
∫ 1
r∗ F (p) dp >
∫ 1
r∗ G(p) dp.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Consider a committee with five individuals where E > {B,D}, where {A,C,D} >
{B,E} > {C,D}, and where {A,B} > D. An example of parameters fulfilling these
conditions is (in strengths) a = 10, b = 11, c = 15, d = 20, e = 32. Indeed, e > b + d,
a+ c+ d > b+ e > c+ d, and a+ b > d.
The order BDAEC implements the first best. A is credible after B and D disagree,
since {A,B} > D. Then E is credible too. Only C may herd then, and the optimal
decision is taken by the designer (Lemma 2). If instead BD agree, A herds. E then
speaks credibly. If BDE agree, C herds too. However, the optimal action is taken, for
{B,D,E} > {A,C}. If E disagrees with BD, C speaks credibly, for {B,C,D} > E.
Again the optimal action is taken, for the opinion of A is irrelevant: {B,C,D} > {A,E}
and {A,B,D} < {C,E}. In this first-best order, the third speaker herds with positive
probability.
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None of the orders where the first three experts all speak credibly for sure yields the
first best. Since {A,B} > D it is clear that E must be the third speaker in these orders.
The possible orders of the two first speakers are then AB,AC,AD,BC,BD. Here a loss
arises in the histories where E agrees with speaker one, while speaker two disagrees with
them. As {A,E} > {C,D}, the two last speakers must herd. But {A,C,D} > {B,E}, so
the transmitted information must imply the wrong action by the designer.
For completion we mention without proof that the other first-best orders in this example
are ACBED, ADBEC, BCAED, DECAB, and DECBA.
Proof of Proposition 5.
This result is proved with the following example. An expert’s strength is the log-
likelihood, r = log(ρ/(1−ρ)). Consider first a five-person committee C1 where the members
have strengths a = 4, b = 4 + ε2, c = 5, d = 6 + ε, e = 7. ε < 1 is considered arbitrarily
close to zero. It is straightforward to verify that d+ e > a+ b+ c, b+ d > e, c+ d > b+ e,
which means {D,E}  {A,B,C}, {B,D}  E, {C,D}  {B,E}. The order DEBCA
now implements first-best. After agreement by D and E, it is irrelevant to find out what
ABC think. When instead D and E disagree, B and C speak credibly, so that eventual
herding by A (the last speaker) does not entail any loss of efficiency.
Consider next C2 where the strength of B is changed upwards to b = 4 + 2ε + ε2.
Consider also C3 which is C2 modified with the strength of A improved to a = 4 + 2ε. On
C3, a + b + c > d + e, so {A,B,C}  {D,E}, our case of inefficiency described in the
proof of Proposition 3. Moreover, c+ d < b+ e and a+ e > c+ d. We will not derive the
second-best order for C3, but we will prove that any order in C3 implies a serious loss of
information compared to C1, and in particular that the second-best order must achieve a
lower utility for the designer than in C1. Once we have that C3 does worse than C1, it must
be the case by implication that C3 does worse than C2, or C2 does worse than C1.
Since C3 has {A,B,C}  {D,E}, we know that under any order, when the two first
speakers agree, the signals of the next three speakers are lost. Consider first those orders
where the two first speakers are not DE. Then, whenever the two first speakers agree,
the other three signals are lost. In the case where the other three signals were all opposed
to those of the two first speakers, the decision which is implemented is significantly worse
than the first-best. For the combined strength of the two first signals is at most 12, while
the remaining signals have a total strength of at least 14. As 12−14 = −2 is quite far from
the indifference point zero, the loss in designer payoff is serious. When ε is sufficiently
small, this serious loss is not compensated by the small gain (of order ε) from the improved
signal qualities of A and B.
Consider finally the orders in C3 where the two first speakers are DE. Assume that
D and E disagree. If the third speaker agrees with E, we see that the fourth and fifth
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speakers must remain silent, because {A,E}  {C,D}. When those two last speakers
agree with D, their combined strength is at least 14, while the combined strength of E
and the third speaker is at most 12.
Proof of Lemma 4.
The low ability type announces signals which pool with those of the high type, because
revelation of low type would result in the lowest possible payoff. Consider the case q ∈ (b, 1]
and let µ denote the probability with which type b sends message m1 when seeing σ0. Let




p(1− g) + (1− p)(1− b)(1− µ)
h00(p) =
pg
pg + (1− p)b(1− µ)
h11(p) =
pg
pg + (1− p)[b+ (1− b)µ]
h10(p) =
p(1− g)
p(1− g) + (1− p)[(1− b) + bµ]
be the equilibrium updating on reputation. Indifference of the expert of type b with signal
σ0 dictates that the expected reputational payoff when reporting m0 equals that achieved
when reporting m1:
f b0(q)V (h01(p)) + (1− f b0(q))V (h00(p)) = f b0(q)V (h11(p)) + (1− f b0(q))V (h10(p)).
Notice that h01 (p) = h00 (p) = 1 at µ = 1, so that it would be better to report signal m0
(the left-hand side of the equation above strictly exceeds the right-hand side). At µ = 0
instead h01 (p) = h10 (p) < h00 (p) = h11 (p), so that it would be better to report signal m1
(the right-hand side weakly exceeds the left-hand side). By continuity, indifference holds
for some equilibrating µ ∈ (0, 1).
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